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may be, it is believed that the present translator—an ardent student of German philosophy—has successfully coped with the difficulties of the task, and that his translation will satisfy all reasonable expectations.

London: Trübner & Co., 57 and 59 Ludgate Hill.

PRAYER OF MARY, QUEEN OF SCOTS.

[FOUND IN HER BOOK OF DEVOTIONS. PROBABLY WRITTEN A SHORT TIME BEFORE HER EXECUTION.]

O Domine Deus! speravi in te;
O care mi Jesu! nunc libera me:
In dura catena, in misera poena,
Desidero te.
Languendo, gemendo, et genuflectendo;
Adoro, imploro, ut liberes me.

TRANSLATION.

O Blessed Redeemer! my hope lies in thee;
O Jesus, Beloved! now liberate me:
In fetters I languish, and in my soul's anguish,
I supplicate thee.
Heart-rending sighs sending, on knee lowly bending,
I adore, and implore thee to liberate me.

THEODORE HARRIS.

CONCORD, MASS.

BOOK NOTICES.

LA REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L'ÉTRANGER. Edited by TH. RIBOT.

[The contents of Volumes VIII to XII of this valuable philosophical journal will be published in a future number of this journal. The contents of Vols. I to VII will be found in *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, x, p. 109, and xiii, p. 44.—Ed.]

January, 1882:

This number is devoted to: (1) "Musical Æsthetics in France. I. Psychology of Vocal Music," by Ch. Lévêque. The author states that "the philosophy of the beautiful and of art, or general æsthetics, has developed more slowly, and produced fewer works, in France than in Germany. France has not lacked eminent critics on these subjects, but they have not gone deeply into the philosophy of the art. This is especially true of music. Those uncultured in it are not tempted to write of it psychologically. J. J. Rousseau, and a few other noted writers, advanced the study of music by method, but not until within twenty years has a complete treatise been met with." M. Lévêque analyzes "The Philosophy of Music," by M. Charles Beauquier, as a sam-

ple of the progress of musical æsthetics, and acknowledges it to be a truly philosophical work.

(2) "The Principle of Morals," by Ch. Secrétan. First article. "Each spring delights our eyes with flowers like those of the year before, and each generation of men agitates the problems that their fathers flattered themselves they had solved. Incontestable in the domain of mathematics, of sensible experience and industry, the law of progress does not seem to extend its empire to the study of the deepest causes—those of our origin and destiny. Men for centuries have universally questioned themselves on the law of their activity without having found an answer sufficiently evident to unite them in the same conviction." M. Secrétan pursues his subject at length under the heads of: 1. *Obligation*. Herein he maintains that all moral doctrine revolves upon duty and supposes liberty. The question, "What ought I to do?" would have no meaning if there were not several courses possible to follow, of which only one is that of duty. Thus, free-will and the sentiment of obligation form the conditions of moral thought, because they are the very conditions of practical activity. 2. *Liberty*. M. Secrétan argues that the conception of obligation includes a conception of liberty, and that one cannot be obliged by duty to follow one course, and be rigorously determined by nature to follow another; the fatality which sometimes draws one to recognize evil is relative and secondary. 3. *Duty in Empiricism*. The highest logic is found only in morals. Reciprocally, morals are founded on logic, the indispensable preliminaries of which are obligation and liberty. A consistent empiricism will never venture to formulate a moral, for this act implies an ideal universally required of thought—or, in other words, an obligation. A logical mind does not regard obligation as other than the feeling of being obliged. 4. *Duty in Rationalism*. However rationalists may identify themselves with science, they have not obtained philosophy unless they can explain what knowledge is in itself. The pre-eminence of practical reason, the superiority of virtue over science, of the will over the understanding, demonstrate themselves to whoever asks, "What am I?" The superiority of virtue over science is defined within its just limits to him who asks, "What ought I to do?" The question confesses that study is a duty, and that science is a virtue necessary to all others. Kant and Fichte so understood it. 5. *Experience and the a priori in Morals*. This argument is based on the relations of morals to metaphysics, in which the author continues to define the idea of duty and the conception of the ideal. The subject of morals is exhaustively treated by him under the divisions herein mentioned, and the nature and beliefs of man are minutely defined, and his relations to spiritual influence argued with earnestness and faith.

(3) "Monism in Germany." First article, by D. Nolen. The writer says that the systems that have sprung up in Germany from the awakening of philosophic speculation within fifteen years seem to have united to avenge the name and defend the principles of monism. The word is ascribed to the invention of Wolff. "The monists of the present," this article affirms, "place science before metaphysics, and the problems heretofore belonging to the latter are now solved by science, in which truth alone can be found. M. Nolen considers monism from the scientific standpoint, and outlines its history.

(4) The Book Notices in this number include:

(a) "Discourses on the History of Religions," by A. Réville. Paris: G. Fischbacher, 1881. This volume contains the course of lectures given by M. Réville on the history of religions, and are, according to his critic, James Darmesteter, a model of

philosophic impartiality. Several chapters are devoted to the discussion of the old theories on primitive revelation and primitive tradition, worship, and symbols, and many interesting questions, and the author is proclaimed a master in the art of fine writing. (b) "An Historical Study on the Philosophy of the Renaissance in Italy" (Cesare Crémonini), by Mabileau. Paris: Hachette. This history is a kind of unique monograph of a condensed memoir on the school of Padua. Crémonini was great in the eyes of his contemporaries, and is unknown to-day. M. Mabileau, with designed impartiality in exposing his deficiencies, leads the reader to be partial through charity, the critic, M. Georges Lyon, states. In his opinion, the most interesting portion of the work is that which relates to the relations of the Paduan to the Jesuits and the Inquisition. (c) "Our Duties and our Rights," by M. Ferraz (Paris: Didier), comprises a course delivered before the Faculty of Letters at Lyons, recommended by the critic, F. B., to masters and pupils, as very instructive and clearly written. (d) "The History of Psychology," by Dr. Herm. Siebeck. Gotha: Perthes, 1880. This history differs from others, says the critic, Edmond Colsenet, in giving the beginning and development of the sciences particularly relating to man, physiology, and medicine. The first part treats of the beginning of psychology before Socrates and the sophists. The second part, "The Constitution of Psychology as a Philosophic Science," by Socrates and Plato, in the sense of dualism. (e) "Literary Polemics in the Fourth Century before Jesus Christ," by Gustav Teichmüller. Breslau: William Koebner, 1881. Paul Tannery analyzes this work. In his opinion, no more important one on philosophy has been issued for a long while. The author throws new light on the dialogues of Plato. Under Bibliographical Notices, Henri Marion reviews a work on Bacon by Thomas Fowler. London: Sampson & Low. "A strong and substantial work." "Hartley and James Mill," by G. Spencer Bower. London: Sampson & Low. The first part is devoted to biographies, the second to philosophic opinions and systems, and the third examines the value and influence of their doctrines. According to Th. Ribot, this volume is the best *résumé* of the doctrines of Hartley and Mill.

(5) Review of Foreign Italian Periodicals.

(a) "Rivista di Filosofia Scientifica" for July; (b) "La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane" for April, June, and August.

February Number:

(1) "The System of Spinoza in France," by P. Janet. "The history of Spinoza's system in France may be divided into three periods. In the seventeenth century Spinoza was an object of curiosity to some strong minds, and of execration and horror to believers who saw in him only a 'monster.' In the eighteenth century, with some few exceptions, he was scorned and neglected as obscure, barbarous, indecipherable. In the nineteenth century, owing chiefly to the German influence, he is restored to honor, finds new disciples, and is treated with respect even by his adversaries." These three phases the author of this article chooses for the basis of a very exact study, both critical and biographical, with a synopsis of the estimates of the various adversaries of Spinoza. In Paul Janet's belief, the noble and superior qualities of Spinoza's system are such as might be appropriated by Spiritualism, leaving the lesser ones to its opponents. Spinoza could be divided into halves, one being claimed by the followers of Descartes, the other by those of Diderot.

(2) "The Faculties of the Child at the Period of Birth," by B. Perez, is a semi-physical, semi-psychological treatise, which evinces an excellent understanding of the mental power of infants.

(3) "Monism in Germany," by Nolen, is concluded in a lengthy analysis of Hartmann, and has varied and interesting philosophical features.

(4) "The Seven Enigmas of the World" is the title of a speech delivered before the Academy of Berlin, July 8, 1880, in honor of its founder, Leibnitz, by M. Dubois-Reymond. "The seven enigmas" are: 1. The intimate nature of matter and force; 2. The origin of movement; 3. The origin of life; 4. The apparent finality in nature; 5. The origin of sensation; 6. The origin of reflected thought and language; 7. Free-will. If M. Reymond has not solved these enigmas, he seems to have compared and studied them with profound insight, if we may judge by the presentation of "C. S.," who offers little comment.

(5) The Book Notices are:

(a) "Positivism and Experimental Science," by the Abbé De Broglie. Paris: Victor Palmé. According to his critic, Ch. Secrétan, De Broglie is a clear, fertile, exact writer, agreeable and eloquent, and courageous in his opinions. His work is destined to arrest the progress of error, and is "thoroughly polemic." (b) "On the Circulation of the Blood in the Brain of Man," by Angelo Mosso, Salviucci, Rome, 1880. The important question considered in this work is the circulation in the brain during mental work and during sleep, and what are the physical conditions of Conscience. The subject is ably treated, and an excellent idea of the work is given by "E. G." (c) "Berkeley," by A. Campbell Fraser, LL. D. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. The biographical portion of this book contains a correspondence between Berkeley and Sir John Percival, reviewed by A. Penjon. (d) "Studies on the History of Primitive Institutions," by Sir Henry Sumner Maine, translated from English into French by M. Leyritz. Paris: Thorin. All Europe has saluted the author as a master in the science of origins, and any work by him, says his critic, Henri Marion, should be called to the attention of the thinking public. (e) "Habit, and its Influence on Education," by Dr. Paul Radestock, A Psychological-Pedagogical Study. Berlin, 1882, R. Appelius. (f) "The Analysis," by H. Schmidt, proves this work to be of great merit in mental development and education. (g) "The Geometric Number of Plato," a new interpretation, by J. Dupuis. Paris: Hachette, 1881. The critic, Paul Tannery, does not always agree with the writer in numerals, but thinks his interpretation the most "plausible" of any that has appeared or will appear. (h) "History of the Sciences in Belgium," by Ch. Lagrange, E. Lagrange, A. Gilkinet. Four volumes comprise this history, and present the intellectual development of Belgium since 1830.

(6) Review of Foreign Periodicals.

(a) "Experimental Review of Freniatria and Legal Medicine." (b) "Archivio de Psichiatria, and Criminal Anthropology."

March Number:

(1) "The Stages of the Religious Idea in Humanity," based on a new book by Eduard von Hartmann, by M. Vernes. "Whoever regards religion as an illusion," says M. Hartmann, "must also regard as illusion the apparent development (progression) to which this illusion gives place; but he who has the conviction that there is a real development in religious matters cannot maintain that the object of this development is a pure illusion." This thesis is discussed on every point by M. Vernes. M. Hartmann attempts to trace religion to the animal origin of man, questioning if animals have or have had a religion. He adopts the term used by the famous Max Müller, a savant in matters relating to India—henotheism—which M. Vernes defines as the common origin of abstract monism, polytheism, or monotheism. Henotheism is based upon a con-

tradition. Man seeks divinity and finds gods; he addresses each of these gods in turn as if they were the divinity, and confers upon each predicates which bring into question the divinity of other gods, and, by addressing different demands to each, he unconsciously denies their natural divinity. M. Vernes does not think that the fact that the premises of M. Hartmann are approved by the eminent Max Müller renders them less open to discussion. In this belief he considers religion in all its forms and to remote ages, and tests M. Hartmann's arguments by comparison with historical facts, the result of which is an instructive and interesting view of religious origin and division.

(2) "Musical Æsthetics in France," second article. "The Psychology of Instruments," by Ch. Lévêque. M. Lévêque compares the various musical instruments in their physical effect upon the voice. Stringed instruments, being capable of producing sustained notes, harmonize with the voice, and the piano changes the natural tones of the voice, since the latter is in subjection to it. The more musical an instrument, the more it is the voice, which is the greatest of all instruments, and upon which musical thought, the expression of the soul, can be impressed and conveyed in musical language to others, as if this unlimited natural instrument, the voice, were passive material. With this statement the author discusses the expressive power of various instruments, and the capability as well as the usual misunderstanding of the voice.

(3) "The Principle of Morals," second article, by Ch. Secrétan. The continuance of this subject is a wider examination of the principles given in the beginning of the argument previously published. The divisions under which it is herein presented are:

The *a priori* element of principle.

The *a priori* in the conception of the world.

The empiric element of principle in nature.

Moral Unity—Discussion of the Objections to Unity.

(4) Under Book Reviews are mentioned:

(a) "Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy," by F. Pollock. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880. Reviewed by Jules Lagneau, who pronounces the work to be produced in leisure with great thought and a conscientious care amounting to piety, and with a patience and candid reasoning with which Spinoza would have his works studied. The synopsis of M. Lagneau forms a clear and connected *résumé* of Spinoza's principles as understood by M. Pollock, and his enthusiasm for the latter is easily allowed when considering the interesting matter he has found for approval. (b) "History of the New Philosophy," second volume, by Windelband. Reviewed by Henri Marion. This history treats of philosophy before Kant, Kantian philosophy, and philosophy after Kant. The second volume treats exclusively of Kant and his German successors. The author treats the subject with ardor, and his views are very comprehensive; but there are defects in the arrangement of matter, and a lack of titles where needed, according to the estimate of his critic. (c) "Inductive Knowledge," by Th. Jacob. Unger, Berlin, 1881. Reviewed by A. Debon. Three interesting questions form the object of what this critic calls a "curious study": 1. How is the understanding of conception to be defined—that is to say, its signification and scientific value? 2. In what consists the demonstrating link of the attributes of conception in all kinds of reasoning, either mathematical or experimental deduction? 3. On what is based induction itself, understood in the common sense of the word, that is, the extension of right or law demonstrated, in all time and in all places in the same conditions. (d) "Saint Catherine of Sienna; Psycho-pathological Observations," by Alfonso Asturaro. Naples: Morano, 1881. This brochure is a sketch, and not a complete life. The author speaks respectfully of Catherine, but re-

gards her as influenced by hysteria springing from physical causes, and from this condition arose her visions and ecstasies.

(5) Review of Foreign Periodicals.

April Number :

(1) "Psychological Methods and Experimental Psychology," from the recent works of M. Wundt, by G. Séailles. An account of the personal labors of M. Wundt and his pupils in the laboratory of the university at Leipzig.

(2) "Psychology of Great Men," first article, by H. Joly. The author says that it is more difficult to study the superior than the degenerate forms of human intelligence. The man of genius, in the accredited opinion, is more occupied in doing than in asking how he does; he bears with him, it is generally asserted, the secret of his creation. As for ordinary minds, it is, unfortunately, easier for them to grasp what they are themselves, and to understand the weaknesses of every nature against which they daily defend themselves, than to penetrate the conditions of existence and to measure the heights of those sublime faculties whose development has been so quickly arrested in themselves. Works on madness and crime abound, but those which treat of genius are not only rare, but are almost always devoted to depreciating their subject, to bringing out the vices or weaknesses of great characters, and discovering in them the germs of physical or mental maladies, which so often form the greater part of the inheritance on which their posterity can count. A genius M. Joly defines as having had his head higher than the majority of men, and his feet, perhaps, as low as the smallest child, or even beast. He may be a genius in some attributes only. In this first article he analyzes intuition, inspiration, and inheritance, and presents many striking thoughts.

(3) M. Secrétan concludes his subject, "The Principles of Morals," discussing it further under the heads: "Résumé of the Deduction. Impossibility of Subjective Morals: Religious Morals—Personal Interest—Individual Perfection—Charity—Justice."

(4) Book Notices:

(a) "Inward Speech," an essay on Descriptive Psychology, by Victor Egger. Paris: Germer Baillière, 1881. "Inward speech," says the author, "is something well known but greatly ignored, especially by philosophers." The analysis which Victor Brochard gives of this book fills several pages. He pronounces M. Egger a pure psychologist, presenting his subject without reference to physiology. His style is remarkably finished, his thoughts carefully elaborated, and his work one of great distinction. (b) "Probity and Moral Law: Ethical and Teleological," by Mme. Clémence Royer. Paris: Guillaumin & Co., 1881. This author has written many important philosophical works, and this one her critic pronounces the boldest expression of evolutionism in morals, even going beyond the conclusions of H. Spencer in his "Data of Ethics"; for it embraces in a vast synthesis the totality of beings, organic and inorganic. "A work of serious merit, always suggestive and frequently profound." (c) "J. Salvador, His Life, Works, and Criticisms," by Colonel Gabriel Salvador. Paris: Calmann Lévy. Joseph Salvador was one of the first and boldest initiators of religious criticism in the nineteenth century. Since 1822 he has, as M. Renan avers, thrown a new and "audacious" light upon the origin of religion. (d) "The Power of Sound," by Edmund Gurney. London: Smith, Elder & Co. A fine treatise on musical æsthetics.

(5) Foreign Periodicals.

May Number:

(1) "Determinism and Liberty," "Liberty demonstrated by Mechanics," by J. Delboëuf. "If there is a problem which inspires, and at the same time leads to despair,"

says this author, "it is that of liberty. Since the day that man began to reflect on his own nature he has not ceased to put this question to himself, 'Am I free?' The answer varies according to his stand-point. If a legislator or judge, free-will is to him a dogma; if a priest or believer, he lays it as a sacrifice at the feet of divinity; if a philosophical moralist, he finds in his inmost being the irrefragable proof of the independence of his conscious thought; if a philosopher in natural philosophy, the laws of nature, universal and immutable, prevent him from granting to any being whatsoever the privilege of escaping from it." The author, under the first division of his subject—I. "Ordinary arguments for and against free-will"—continues: "If an inexorable fatalism rules our thoughts and actions, there is no longer truth or science; error is legitimate, and there is no longer error; the wise man and fool are both in the right, and there are no longer fools or wise men. All opinions, even those qualified as absurd, are only what they must be; the determinist who torments himself to defend his cause is only a puppet in the hands of destiny, which at a given moment draws him from behind the scenes and makes him speak and gesticulate on the stage before other puppets, his spectators.

"Here the adversaries of fatalism triumph, but it is a mere victory of words. These unassailable consequences the determinist accepts without the least repugnance. It must be thus," he says. "We can do nothing about it. Each plays the part assigned to him for all eternity, and plays it conscientiously, with the persuasion, more or less profound, that he is the author of it."

II. "Can free-will be an illusion?"

The determinists answer the moralists that the idea of freedom and faith in free-will is an illusion. The author examines the premises of both believers. The determinists confess that they believe themselves free, although science assures them they are not. The author studies the opposition between faith and science.

III. Can there exist forces capable of modifying their intensity, their direction, or their point of application?

IV. "Of the pretended necessity of a directing principle to regulate cases of indeterminate movement."

This subject M. Delbœuf acknowledges to belong to geometricians rather than to philosophers, but he gives the views of noted mathematicians.

V. "To determine a movement, can a force that is null suffice in certain cases?"

VI. "If there are free actions, they cannot imply a creation of force."

Whatever the opinion in regard to the origin of human activity, man stands towards nature as a master to a slave.

(2) "The Renaissance of Materialism," by F. Paulhan. This article is a brief history of the conditions giving rise in France to materialism, and an account of its growth. One of the most obscure points of materialism M. Paulhan declares to be the conception of matter itself, and the materialists cannot answer what matter is. Materialism and positivism he asserts are enemies. The prevailing opinion is that experimental philosophy is a genus of which positivism and materialism are two species.

(3) "Anaximander of Miletus; The Infinite, and Evolution and Revolution (Entropie)," by P. Tannery.

This article is a kind of critical synopsis of historical information given by Gustav Teichmüller regarding Anaximander. M. Tannery states that, in the grave question of the origin and destiny of the world, philosophy, since its birth, has been hovering between the thesis of Anaximander and the antithesis of Xenophanes.

June Number :

- (1) "Sociologic Studies in France. I. Animal Colonies," by A. Espinas.

The history of individuality begins for M. Perrier, according to the statement of M. Espinas, with that of organization and life; something like an announcement of this is found in what is poetically called the personality of the atom. The character of the atom and evolution occupy a great portion of this analysis by M. Espinas.

- (2) "Determinism and Liberty," by M. Delbœuf, continued from the May number of "La Revue." "Determinism, as a doctrine, is as ancient as human thought." The continuance of this subject is divided into: Proof of the Existence of Liberty.

I. *Exposé* of mechanism.

II. Law of the fixation of force. Neither this force nor that of the conservation of energy is in contradiction to free-will.

III. Free beings might dispense with time. Distinction between real and abstract uniform time.

IV. There exist discontinued movements.

V. Discontinued movements are explained only by liberty.

- (3) "The Variations of Personality in the Normal State," by F. Paulhan.

"1. The variations of personality, analogous to those revealed by the morbid conditions described by various authors, are very frequent in the normal state. 2. If man can be said to have a certain unity, this unity has its basis in the body, and not in the soul, and in the lower rather than the higher functions of the brain. 3. Man has not a completed unity; it seems to be only in progress of formation." From this thesis the author gives at length views of pathological phenomena.

July Number :

- (1) "The Sense of Locality and its Organs in Animals and Man," by C. Viguier.

In the words of an unknown writer, from whom M. Viguier quotes, "Natural history has been haunted by a phantom known by the name of *instinct*, which is invoked in all difficult cases, as was the term phlogistic by the chemists of the last century. Lewes regards instinct only as degenerated intelligence. The wonderful faculty that animals possess of returning to places from which they have been taken, shut up in boxes from which they saw nothing, M. Viguier attributes to the sense of smell. The animal perceives a succession of odors along his route, and by them traces his way back, no matter how many turns there may be. With man the hand is closely connected with the power of vision; an animal, not having this member, has a keener scent to act with vision. Animals have hereditary aversions and fears, and their object becomes known to them by their sense of smell. The chief facts of this article are presented to prove a distinct sense of locality in man analogous to the sense of smell in animals.

- (2) "The Psychology of Great Men," by H. Joly. The continuation of this subject by M. Joly treats of Heredity in Families, and its effect in the perpetuation of talent.

(3) "Will as Power of Judgment, and Adaptation," by Th. Ribot. In this study the author proposes to study anomalies, and to draw conclusions upon the normal state. The fundamental principle which dominates the psychology of the will, in the healthy as in the morbid state, is that every state of consciousness has a tendency to express itself by a movement or act. Activity in the animal is not a beginning, but an end; not a cause, but a result. This is the essential point which should not be lost sight of, and alone explains the physiology and pathology of will.

August Number :

- (1) "The Philosophy of F. Glisson," by H. Marion. This author states that philosophers have questioned whether Leibnitz has not been influenced by the English physi-

cian, Francis Glisson. Little is known of the life of Glisson excepting facts relating to his ancestry. The object of M. Marion's study is a work of Glisson's, entitled, "The Energetic Nature of Substance, or of the Life of Nature," which was published in Glisson's seventy-fifth year, and which he spent ten years in writing. This work had little reputation when produced, and is now very rare. M. Marion compares Leibnitz and Glisson, and undertakes to prove how much his works were studied by Leibnitz.

(2) "Determinism and Liberty," by Delbœuf, is concluded.

I. Liberty demonstrated by mechanics. Mechanical evaluation of the motive power of will.

II. Psychical origin of the free nexus of forces.

III. The action of free nexi of forces.

IV. The future of free beings.

(3) "The Psychology of Great Men," by H. Joly. "The Great Man and Contemporaries." The author quotes at length the views of the "distinguished American philosopher," Mr. William James, as published in "The Atlantic." M. Marion devotes several pages to the consideration of Mr. James's beliefs, but does not agree with him in attributing genius more or less to chance.

September Number:

(1) "The Right and Action," by Ch. Secrétan. M. Secrétan suggests *goodness* as the word to express moral activity. He discusses: 1. The problems of evil. 2. Pure and applied morals. 3. Theodicy.

(2) "The Common Features of Nature and History," by G. Tarde. The writer asks why social science is still to be born, or why it is born so late among its adult and vigorous sisters. He enters upon the study of history to aid him in his examination of the question. One thesis that he maintains is that all similarities are due to repetitions. 1. All similarities observed in the chemical, physical, and astronomical world have for their only explanation and possible cause periodical and principally vibratory movements. 2. All similarities of the world result from hereditary transmission. 3. All similarities that are remarked in the social world are the direct or indirect fruit of imitation in all its forms.

(3) "Syllogism and Knowledge," by E. Pannier. Between the classic thesis of syllogism, "which engenders science," and the modern system, which contests the reality of syllogism, there is less difference than there seems to be. In both, the fundamental idea is the same; syllogism ought to be demonstrative; it is or is not a method of acquiring knowledge. The error common to the two schools consists in a false appreciation of the function of reasoning. The conclusions which M. Pannier arrives at in his study are that "reasoning is not an instrument of knowledge, but an operation of analysis and classification, effected by the means of verbal substitutions, and which, having nothing to reveal to us outside of the premises given, reposes neither on a categorical form of the mind, nor on an axiomatic truth, nor on any principle of transcendence whatsoever. We conclude because we define, and our definitions have no other object than to create the whole substance of our reasoning."

October Number:

(1) "Sociologic Studies in France. II. Social Contemporary Science," by A. Espinas. "If the individual is the product of an association, the logical result is that every association can be individualized. It would indeed be strange if Nature, so faithful to herself in the development of her works, nature which is one like mind, because mind

is either a nameless monstrosity or a part of nature—that nature, we repeat, after having, by a persevering process, constructed all living beings on one plan, should renounce this plan and adopt wholly new principles, when it was a question of constructing societies with these same individuals as elements.” M. Espinas further considers his subject from the stand points of art and science.

(2) “A Precursor of Maine de Biran,” by Paul Janet, of the Institute. Maine de Biran in his writings has quoted a work that is little known, and which was written by a physician of Montpellier, named Rey Régis. The title is “Natural History of the Soul,” which should not be confounded with one of the same name by Dr. Charp, of London. From this work Maine de Biran extracts a curious physiological fact, which has become classic in psychology. It refers to a paralytic who had lost movement without the sense of feeling, but who, when touched beneath a coverlet, without seeing the spot, was incapable of locating it. He had lost the faculty of localization in losing a sense of movement, a remarkable fact which supported a theory dear to Maine de Biran, that movement or voluntary will is the true cause of the localization of perceptions. This work Rey of Régis, M. Janet thinks, has never been quoted or used by any philosopher, and Biran quoted it only for the above passage. Nevertheless, he, in M. Janet's belief, was more or less influenced in his ideas by this work. Rey Régis defends against the Cartesians, and especially against Malebranche, the direct and ruling power of the soul upon the body; the indication of original and investigating thought. M. Janet gives somewhat of a history of the Cartesians, and a full analysis of Rey Régis. The second portion of the work relates to the union of the soul and the body, and he thinks is less original than the first part.

(3) “The Weaknesses of Will,” by Th. Ribot. Irresolution, which is a beginning of a morbid state, has inward causes which pathology will make clear to us; it comes from the weakness of incitations or their ephemeral action. Among irresolute characters, a few—the number is small—are so through a wealth of ideas. The comparison of motives, reasoning, calculation of consequences, constitute an extremely complex cerebral state, in which tendencies to action impede each other. But this wealth of ideas is not in itself a sufficient cause for irresolution; it is only an assisting cause. The true cause here, as everywhere, is in the character. Among the irresolute who lack ideas it is more evident. If they act, it is always where there is less action or less resistance required. Deliberation with difficulty ends in choice, and choice with more difficulty in action. The author discusses and compares morbid conditions as results and causes.

November Number :

(1) “Psychology of Great Men,” by H. Joly. “Genius and Inspiration” is the concluding article of the interesting series of M. Joly. He questions whether it was chance, as popularly believed, that led Columbus to discover America; and in treating of the great geniuses of the world he discusses the conditions outside of themselves which brought into action natural tendencies awaiting such causes. The reasoning of the writer and the many points which he considers invest his subject with unusual interest, heightened by a charming style.

(2) “Sociologic Studies in France. II. Social Contemporary Science” (the conclusion), by A. Espinas. The writer begins his concluding article boldly by stating that if a liberal should venture to declare, in any political assembly whatsoever in France, that the declaration of the rights of men, the whole “revolutionary religion,” is only an immense postulate, he would rouse the general indignation and be regarded as a renegade.

To distinguish between faith and science, practice and speculation form the starting-points in the discussion of M. Espinas, which is earnest, instructive, and spirited.

December Number :

(1) "The New Expedients in Favor of Free-Will," by A. Fouillée. "Among the moralists," says the writer, "those particularly attached to spiritualism or criticism, a kind of anti-scientific reaction in the interests of morals has been observed for some time." The arguments of MM. Secrétan and Renouvier and others, who have devoted themselves to the subject of free-will, are minutely analyzed by M. Fouillée.

(2) "History of the Conception of the Infinite in the Sixth Century before Jesus Christ," by P. Tannery. This is an article of rare historical value to which no synopsis could do justice, as it is replete with facts in point of history and philosophy, which are considered very carefully from many stand-points by the writer. As in a preceding article, he studies the premises of Gustav Teichmüller.

(3) "The Conditions of Happiness and Human Evolution," by F. Paulhan. "Pessimism is a fashionable problem. People are greatly occupied with it, either in the way of defence or attack." The author asserts that he shall examine only a few points: 1. What gives value to life? Generally speaking, happiness. 2. Do the blessings of life exceed the ills? Pessimism often comes from the indignation we feel when deprived of happiness—our supposed right. The adaptation of an organization to its surroundings constitutes the conditions of happiness. Evolution, development, and the education of the people the writer discusses as causes of happiness. He concludes by saying that if pessimism were perfectly established, and it were proved that life is and will be an evil, then general suicide would be the best practical good, and a duty, man ending his own suffering and sparing future generations.

January (1883) Number :

(1) "Musical Aesthetics in France. III. Psychology of the Orchestra and Symphony," by Ch. Lévêque. The author discusses rhythm, the expression of various instruments, and states many interesting facts relating to music in general.

(2) "Contemporary Philosophers: M. J. Lachelier," by G. Séailles. "M. Lachelier," the writer affirms, "has taken great pains not to make himself known. Like Descartes, he did not like notoriety. He has, nevertheless, exerted a great influence upon French philosophy. He taught in the Normal School, and did not write much, but his teachings were very powerful."

(3) "The Criminal Statistics of the Last Half-Century," by G. Tarde. "What are properly called crimes have diminished nearly one half within the last half-century, and simple offences have more than trebled. Some say it is owing to increased education and refinement, or equalizing society. The small offences arise from the increased wants of the people, excited by their intellectual development. The writer throws a great deal of light upon his subject, and his statistics are of an interesting nature.

VIRGINIA CHAMPLIN.